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POWER AND PROGRESS IN LATE CAPITALISM: AN EXPLORATION OF 
GILLES DELEUZE’S ‘POSTSCRIPT ON SOCIETIES OF CONTROL’ 
 
The laws of history are as absolute as the laws of physics, 
 and if the probabilities of error are greater, it is only because 
 history does not deal with as many humans as physics 
 does atoms, so that individual variations count for more. 
 
— Isaac Asimov, Foundation and Empire 
 
From a certain point onward there is no longer any turning back.  
That is the point that must be reached. 
 




How ought we characterise the exercise of power in our societies? Are they societies 
that confine and discipline our bodies, or ones that control us in potentially subtler 
ways?  
 
This article adopts the framework for analysis used by twentieth century French 
philosopher Gilles Deleuze in his short but defining essay on the subject, ‘Postscript 
on Societies of Control’.1 It firstly considers the background to the concept of control, 
then provides a definition of the concept, and, finally, asks whether our society is one 
of control. It argues that Deleuze is correct to say control has replaced discipline as 




In order to address the question of whether societies of control are increasingly 
replacing disciplinary societies, it is imperative first to understand what disciplinary 
societies are.  
 
Discipline is a concept developed most powerfully by Deleuze’s contemporary, 
Michel Foucault. 2  Foucault’s philosophy primarily concerns the technologies of 
power operating within society and their effect on human autonomy. He pursues this 
study via a genealogical approach; that is, he employs a historical critique to 
interrogate the workings of powers at play in modern society. In this way—despite his 
vocal opposition to Hegel—Foucault is very much Hegelian in his belief that close 
examination of historical parallels and events can clarify and deepen our 
understanding of present-day technologies of power and how they shape or restrict 
our autonomy.3  
 
 
1 Gilles Deleuze, ‘Postscript on Societies of Control’ (1992) 59 October 3–7. 
2 On their complex relationship before and after Foucault’s death, see François Dosse, ‘Deleuze and 
Foucault: A Philosophical Friendship’ in Nikolae Morar, Thomas Nail and Daniel W Smith (eds), 
Between Deleuze and Foucault (Edinburgh University Press 2016). 
3 James Muldoon, ‘Foucault’s Forgotten Hegelianism’ (2014) 21 Parrhesia 102. 
Through his historical work, which spans various societal and public institutions, 
Foucault identifies a fundamental change in the mechanisms of power exercised by 
the state in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. He articulates this shift as a 
transition away from sovereign power to technologies of discipline.  
 
This notion of discipline and disciplinary society is perhaps best exemplified by 
Foucault’s enquiry into the French penal system in his Discipline and Punish.4 The 
book opens with vivid depictions of public torture and execution in pre-eighteenth 
century France. Foucault explains that the physicality and the public nature of 
punishment in the French criminal system up until then was an essential aspect of the 
exercise of sovereign power. Yet, while brutal public spectacle instilled fear and awe, 
it also provided public fora for communities to revolt against the perceived injustices 
of the sovereign. By moderating power through the benevolent reform of the criminal, 
by the discipline of the docile body, and by the fragmentation of public space into 
discrete, segregated institutions, state power could be obscured and, thus, maintained. 




In his ‘Postscript’, Deleuze—building on the work of Foucault—argues that the 
twentieth century has marked a shift from disciplinary societies to societies of control. 
A precise definition of control and societies of control has proven to be elusive;5 it is 
therefore helpful to consider both the antecedents and critiques of Deleuze’s analysis 




Deleuze has attributed the concept of control to William Burroughs.7 Burroughs, in 
turn, provides not a definition of control, but brief observations as to its exercise; in 
truth, his analogies are of only limited assistance when read in the context of 
mechanisms of power within society at large.8 Nevertheless, there are two salient 
points to note. Firstly, Burroughs establishes that when one maintains total or absolute 
power over the actions of another, they can more accurately be said to be using them 
rather than controlling them. Secondly, Burroughs shows that control requires 
concessions and illusions: controllers must make concessions to the controlled in 
order to maintain the illusion of choice and free agreement, obscuring their true 
motives in order to avoid revolt. 
 
In contrast to Burroughs, Félix Guattari provides an analogy of control that usefully 
supports the conception Deleuze comes to advance: the gated home and community 
accessed and exited via electronic cards. 9  This has elements of discipline, as 
 
4 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (Alan Sheridan tr, 2nd edn, Vintage 
Books 1995) 
5 Michael Hardt, ‘The Global Society of Control’ (1998) 20(3) Discourse 139. 
6 Deleuze cites these authors in his ‘Postscript’: (n 1).  
7 Gilles Deleuze, ‘Foucault: Lecture 19’ (University of Paris, 15 April 1986). 
8 Burroughs himself concedes his analogy of the life-boat is a ‘primitive’ one: William S Burroughs, 
‘The Limits of Control’ in James Grauerholz and Ira Silverberg (eds), Word Virus: The William S 
Burroughs Reader (4th edn, Fourth Estate 2010). 
9 ‘Postscript’ (n 1) 7. 
movement being granted or denied constitutes a form of confinement. But, as Deleuze 
argues, it also represents a departure from the disciplinary society, as ‘what counts is 
not the barrier but the computer that tracks each person’s position […] and effects a 
universal modulation’.10  
 
Among his identified influences, Deleuze contends that Foucault sees as ‘our 
immediate future’ societies of control. 11  Deleuze particularly emphasises that 
Foucault’s work on discipline is historical (focused on the exercise of power in the 
nineteenth century); we should, therefore, not be so naive as to assume Foucault 
would not have recognised the possibility of further historical change. Indeed, 
Deleuze says that Foucault concludes his Discipline and Punish with the explicit 
recognition that a prison as a physical space is becoming less important in the 
exercise of power. This, Deleuze suggests, presages a fuller analysis of a new sort of 
power.12 
 
Deleuze makes these forceful arguments as to Foucault’s understanding of power in 
response to a critique by Paul Virilio that Foucault did not understand the nature of 
modern power. Ironically, that critique is also an important precursor to Deleuze’s 
analysis. Virilio argues that the patrolling of the highway—and not the prison—
exemplifies the exercise of police power. Deleuze concurs, adding that modern 
authorities possess predictive technologies that anticipate the movement of subjects 
and consequently have less need for confining subjects.  
 
Deleuzian societies of control 
 
That predictive power is a hallmark of control. In his ‘Postscript’, Deleuze fleshes out 
this position polemically. It must be noted that Deleuze never attributes any concrete 
definition to the notion of control itself; he is primarily concerned with how a society 
of control operates. This section will similarly consider the features and modes of 
operation that constitute a Deleuzian society of control.  
 
Much like with the disciplinary society, the technologies of power that govern a 
society of control cannot be boiled down to one single technology or mechanism. 
Instead, there are targeted and multi-faceted ways in which societies of control 
manage the lives of their subjects.  
 
Most fundamentally, there are no enclosures or strictly delineated confined spaces 
(like, for instance, the disciplinary society’s schools, barracks, and factories, which 
are all subject to clear separation from one another). Instead, there is a single 
modulation, which allows for the coexistence and connection of various states (the 
corporation, the education system, and the army are all connected, one flowing into 




11 ‘Postscript’ (n 1) 4. 
12 Foucault refers to it as ‘biopower’. Biopower is not something that this essay will address, but we 
can observe that it may be that the Foucauldian notion of biopower and the Deleuzian notion of control 
are broadly similar or even the same: for a fuller discussion of that relationship, see Thomas Nail, 
‘Biopower and Control’ in Between Deleuze and Foucault (n 2). 
This brings us to the next point: exploring how these spaces or states are connected. 
The disciplinary society operates on the basis that its subjects start over when they 
move from one space to another. Though it does recognise analogies between the 
spaces (the discipline of the school may be similar to the discipline of the army), the 
spaces and norms are ultimately distinct from each other, with one having little 
bearing on the other. Societies of control, on the other hand, are predicated on 
connection between spaces, such that ‘one is never finished with anything.’13 These 
connections encourage a culture of constant progression or improvement. The 
question this cultural attitude begs (to what ends is progression and improvement 
directed?) admits no answer. 
 
There are also differences in the conceptualisation and treatment of the person. The 
disciplinary society takes the individual and subjugates her through discipline so that 
she will conform to the mass. No such subjugation is necessary in societies of control. 
The individual is not viewed as a member of a mass, but as a data point, a market 
audience, a sample.  
 
This allows for targeted control to take shape, where compliance is not forced upon 
the individual (as with discipline) but facilitated. There are no overarching aims or 
requirements outlined by societies of control (no ‘watchwords’). The society is 
governed merely by way of codes that function as ‘passwords’; these can allow or 
deny the individual access to certain information or amenities. The control of access 
is presumably based on the conduct of the individual and is a means of exercising 
control over individuals’ choices: the individual self-disciplines because of incentives 
and disincentives encoded within herself as a data-point. This, in turn, suggests 
(perhaps even necessitates) a degree of technological surveillance that goes beyond 
that of the comparatively simple model of the Benthamic Panopticon Foucault 
famously employs. 
 
Additionally, there are no clear hierarchies, if there are any at all. Unlike in 
disciplinary societies, power is not centralised or in the hands of a single ‘owner’ or 
state. Rather, control is exercised by a corporation—invested with its own 
personhood—comprising stockholders. The make-up of this corporation is transitory 
and fundamentally transformable. 
 
All of these technologies—singular modulation across singular space, an ethos of the 
relentless pursuit of progress, the ‘dividualisation’ or ‘data-fication’ of the individual, 
the facilitation of compliance, the use of codes as passwords, technological 
surveillance, and the absence of clear hierarchies of power—together create a society 




Here we will explore three critiques of Deleuze’s thesis: the privatisation of public 





13 ‘Postscript’ (n 1) 5. 
Michael Hardt deals at length with the Deleuzian conception of societies of control, 
both in his joint work with Antonio Negri on Empire, as well as more specifically, in 
a piece titled ‘The Global Society of Control.’ Here, Hardt contends that there is an 
incompleteness to Deleuze’s work on control, and proceeds to elaborate on the 
operation of societies of control to fill in these purported gaps. He does so by situating 
these societies within his and Negri’s broader framework of Empire. The study is 
multifaceted, but here only one aspect of the critique will be considered: the erasure 
of the dialectic between public and private.  
 
‘There is no more outside,’ insists Hardt.14 This is to say, there are no longer any 
meaningful or permanent divisions between private and public spaces. Nikolas Rose, 
similarly, argues that inherently public spaces (like public parks, libraries, and 
playgrounds) are being abandoned in favour of privatised and privately secured places 
(like shopping malls and arts centres) for acceptable members of the public.15 Those 
who have no legitimate, consumerised reason to occupy these new privatised ‘public’ 
spaces are denied access to them. Populations and classes of people deemed 
‘dangerous’ or ‘undesirable’ are excluded from the private-public spaces and, so, 
from society itself. 
 
Deleuze touches on this idea of exclusion as well, in saying that ‘three quarters of 
humanity’, who are too poor for debt (as in, those who cannot be managed through 
the mechanisms of ‘control’, because these mechanisms rely on monetary and 
consumerist incentives or ‘passwords’) and too numerous of confinement (which 
makes it logistically difficult to subject them to technologies of ‘discipline’ that rely 
on confinement) will have to face exclusion to shanty towns and ghettos.16 
 
From this, we can take two points. Firstly, that neither the societies of control, nor 
disciplinary societies are or have ever been able to exercise control or discipline over 
every individual; when they are unable to, they simply exclude these potentially 
unpredictable and uncontrollable threats to order. Secondly, there is the implicit 
acknowledgment that technologies of control and discipline can coexist; to conceive 
of discipline and control as dichotomous notions would be inaccurate.17  
 
In fact, the question posed by this essay itself may fall victim to a false dichotomy 
between Foucauldian discipline and Deleuzian control. These mechanisms of power 
are not necessarily mutually exclusive. We should, therefore, be wary to adopt a view 
that control represents a natural or irreversible progression (from discipline) in the 
exercise of power (as Hardt and Negri may be suggesting in saying that control is an 
intensification of discipline),18 because they are contingent historical realities. That is 
what Foucault’s work—and Deleuze’s analysis of it—suggested of discipline, and it 
is no less true in the case of control. Thus, we can qualify our thesis by saying that 
while societies of control are increasingly replacing those of discipline, technologies 
of discipline (and even of sovereignty) are still employed in certain contexts. 
 
 
14 Hardt (n 5) 140. 
15 Nikolas Rose, ‘Government and Control’ (2000) 40(2) The British Journal of Criminology 331. 
16 ‘Postscript’ (n 1) 7. 
17 JM Wise, ‘Mapping the Culture of Control: Seeing through The Truman Show’ (2002) 3(1) 
Television & New Media 29. 
18 Nail, ‘Biopower and Control’. 
Surveillance 
 
Surveillance is implicit within Deleuze’s conception of control (in the understanding 
of the individual as a mere data point, not the member of a mass), but Oscar Gandy 
articulates this technology more explicitly.19  Such an emphasis on surveillance is 
problematised, however, by Rose, who posits that societies of control are not 
predicated on surveillance but on the instilling of self-discipline and self-regulation in 
their subjects. That rather misses the mark, because, as we have seen, societies of 
control employ a range of technologies to exercise power. Nothing suggests an 
emphasis on self-discipline ought to exclude the technology of surveillance, which is 




But Rose’s critique of surveillance does helpfully inform another point of discussion: 
the odd ideas prioritised within societies of control. Deleuze makes brilliant and 
incisive concluding remarks about this telos of self-improvement and self-
actualisation. But what are the motivations behind this ethos of motivation? That is 
the question Deleuze poses in his conclusion, and it is a question that largely remains 
unanswered. In some ways, one can only hazard a guess at the mechanisms at work 
here. That is rather the point. Societies of control have evolved such that their 





With definitions—or, rather, understandings—of both disciplinary societies and 
societies of control to hand, this essay considers whether it can be said that the latter 
are replacing the former.   
 
The institutions of the disciplinary society Foucault identifies in his body of work—
the home, the school, the prison, the barracks, the factory—are all still extant. 
However, as we have noted above, there need be no ‘either/or’ as between societies of 
discipline and of control; the question is more accurately one of degree and we must 
identify whether a general movement may be occurring. Again, that movement need 
not be total or irreversible. 
 
Such a movement seems to be taking place all around us. For example, remote 
working and learning, which Deleuze identified as increasing in the 1980’s and which 
has skyrocketed in light of the coronavirus pandemic, has weakened substantially the 
disciplinary segregation of physical space.20 At the same time, it has strengthened the 
all-encroaching productivity ethos of societies of control by placing work or study 
(itself little more than a preparatory step towards work) within the walls of the private 
family home.  
 
 
19 Wise, ‘Culture of Control’ 33. 
20 Deleuze, ‘Foucault: Lecture 18’. 
Whilst coronavirus may have accelerated a shift towards societies of control, this 
trend runs much deeper still. Below, we shall seek to validate the shift Deleuze 
identifies by employing and analysing four impressionistic vignettes.  
 
Vignette A 
In April 2021, Chinese state television broadcast an exposé of intolerable working 
conditions faced by food delivery drivers—long hours, meagre pay, algorithms that 
encourage dangerous driving and heavily fine lateness, and harassment from 
customers who have full and ‘live’ access to drivers’ locations and contact details. 
China’s couriers are estimated to contribute to close to 1% of the country’s economic 
activity, but the undercover government official earned just £4.52 over a 12-hour 
shift.21  
 
The courier works in no strictly delineated or confined space, but everywhere, openly. 
He is the subject of constant surveillance. Customers have his precise location, his 
‘ETA’, the corporation’s promised delivery slot, and his personal mobile phone 
number at their fingertips. The threat of an angry call or harsh review might appear in 
those circumstances to operate rather like a panopticon unconfined by space, 
enforcing conformity.  
 
But that is only a minor part of this story; it is secondary to the algorithmic 
surveillance and control in which both the courier and the customer are merely 
variables. Drivers will be set timescales in which to complete a delivery determined 
by the average speed at which drivers have previously made that journey or a similar 
journey. If they beat that timeframe, they may be rewarded with bonus pay. If they 
fail, their pay will be docked. Both processes—the incentivisation of speed and 
disincentivisation of slowness—are automated. The algorithm does not care how the 
driver gets from A to B, only that he does so quickly and does not damage the 
customer’s goods in the process. So, drivers will travel recklessly in order to beat the 
clock to boost their meagre pay, but this only shortens the average time of journey 
completion, making pay boosts harder to achieve and pay docks more likely and 
contributing to an insane culture of paranoia and uncertainty.  
 
Compliance with the requirements of speed in this system is facilitated, not forced. In 
paying the less perfect worker less and the more perfect worker more, the corporation 
is nudging the courier to an (ultimately ephemeral) standard of compliance. But it 
need take no further punishing or corrective action: it knows that the courier, 
impacted by these forces, will correct himself. The password operating here is that of 
a courier ‘score’ that determines the level of pay afforded for work done.  
 
This is ripe terrain to consider Deleuze’s challenge as to whether the unions will be 
able to resist forces of control upon the breakdown of the workplace. China, where 
organised labour is met with fear and hostility, shows that the communist party will 
intervene by challenging monopolies and exposing low pay. They may moderate the 
technology of power, but they will not extinguish it; the work is too economically 
important for that. In the UK, there have been increased efforts by unions to protect 
 
21 Yuan Yang, ‘China’s food delivery groups slammed after undercover TV exposé’ Financial Times 
(London, 29 April 2021). 
insecure, ‘gig-economy’ labourers and they have had some success.22 But here too the 
overall system of algorithmic control is not removed, but mollified.  
 
Vignette B 
A London-based junior employee at Goldman Sachs, one of the largest investment 
banks in the world, has complained that staff face 18-hour shifts that mean they are 
earning less than the UK living wage and regularly take sick leave due to burnout. In 
2015, US employee Sarvshreshth Gupta, who had been working 100-hour weeks, took 
his own life.23 The company has a £50,000 entry-level base salary.24 The company’s 
average employee takes home about £260,000 per year.25   
 
It is at first blush surprising that employees at Goldman Sachs could be said to be 
subjects of control by twenty-first century technologies of power, and even more 
surprising to suggest that their situation is comparable to that of couriers in China. But 
this is precisely the sort of topsy-turviness that is to be expected from (and ultimately 
serves to legitimate) societies of control, where we all ‘work hard’.  
 
The impetus to ‘get ahead’ is central to the ethos of self-improvement and motivation 
instilled by societies of control. That is perhaps nowhere more evident than amongst 
the new, highly-remunerated, highly-overworked, ‘meritocratic’, professional or 
upper class of managers, bankers, and lawyers. 26  Previously, elite status was 
maintained through generations by inheritance. That method of status-maintenance 
has now mostly been displaced by investments in ‘human capital’. This can be 
achieved directly—through funding private schooling, tuition, and even work 
placements paid for by the volunteer—or indirectly, through covering children’s rent 
and paying for their goods.  
 
The crucial factor in bringing about this shift has been the rise of ‘meritocracy’, which 
purports that success (i.e. the rate of remuneration for one’s work) is a result and 
marker of an individual’s inherent drive and talent but which in reality allows ‘a 
relatively tiny segment of the population […] to transmit advantage from generation 
to generation’ because elite parents stack the odds in favour of their children’s 
advancement from birth. 27  This is the society of control in action: demanding, 
inequitable and possessing an obscured, democratically-papered-over telos, drive and 
skill directed at productive activities.  
 
But the elite class are not spared from the brutalities of this system, as the above 
vignette suggests. Since societies are increasingly meritocratic (in the sense that the 
most skilled and driven will generally be remunerated the most, not in the sense that 
the system promotes a level playing field) young elite professionals still have to work 
incredibly hard to ‘climb the ladder’. Even if they reach seemingly secure positions of 
employment, they will still want to continue to reap the rewards of their labour, still 
 
22 For instance, many will now be recognised as ‘workers’ rather than as ‘self-employed’, with greater 
protections: Uber v Aslam [2021] UKSC 5.  
23 Kalyeena Makortoff, ‘Goldman Sachs junior banker speaks out over “18-hour shifts and low pay’ 
The Guardian (London, 24 March 2021). 
24 ibid.  
25 Michael Foster, ‘Guess How Much Goldman’s Average Salary Is (GS)’ Investopedia (25 June 2019).  
26 Stefan Collini, ‘Snakes and Ladders’ London Review of Books (London, 1 April 2021) 15. 
27 ibid 22. 
need to work intensively to secure funds to invest in their children’s human capital, 
and still be motivated by the overwhelming and corrupting cultural ideal of self-
improvement and motivation.  
 
The name of Goldman Sachs’ personnel team, ‘Human Capital Management’, is 
telling. It has been noted, ‘[l]ives are things that people have; capital has rates of 
return.’28 
 
Vignette C  
About one in every hundred adults in Britain has been trained as a ‘mental health 
first aider’ by the MHFA.29 They advertise their ‘proactive’ services thus: ‘for every 
£1 spent by employers on mental health interventions, they get back £5 in reduced 
absence [...] and staff turnover.’30 The second of five listed responsibilities for first-
aiders is to communicate concerns about ‘anyone in your workplace, for example to 
an appropriate manager.’31 Separately, the UK government is providing ‘£1 million 
for innovative student mental health projects’ that offer targeted support to those 
identified statistically as being at highest risk of mental ill-health.32   
 
Deleuze argued the hospital was being replaced by ‘neighbourhood clinics, hospices, 
and day care’.33 Similarly, the above vignette suggests that the power that would in a 
disciplinary society be exercised by the asylum has, in our societies of control, been 
exercised dispersedly by employers, with the aim being to improve profit-margins and 
productivity rates. The actual mental wellbeing of employees—or, rather, of human 
capital—is a means to that end that may give rise to some incidental good. But even 
these incidental goods are monetised, such as when companies compete on their 
‘work-life balance’ or their inclusion of private therapy in ‘healthcare plans’ so as to 
attract the most human capital.  
 
Under these conditions, the public healthcare officials sectioning or supporting a 
member of the public who risks harm to herself or others are reduced in their 
significance. In their place, the anxious employer preempts possible harm to the 
corporation by proactively addressing and preventing harm to the employee. 
Similarly, ‘mental health teams’ in schools and universities are encouraged by the 
government to anticipate, based on a series of data-sets, those students who are ‘more 
at risk’ and provide targeted interventions to safeguard their health (and, by extension, 
their productivity).  
 
Deleuze says that ‘the socio-technological study of the mechanisms of control […] 
would have to be categorical’. By this it is meant that we must look to each institution 
of power—the healthcare system, the corporate system, the educational system—and 
describe the power being exercised there. The above vignette shows that that has 
become an artificial mode of analysis in this era of control. The healthcare system has 
 
28 ibid. 
29 Mark Rice-Oxley, ‘UK training record number of mental health first aiders’ The Guardian (2 
September 2019). 
30MHFA, ‘Being a Mental Health First Aider: Your Guide to the Role’. 
31 MHFA, ‘Workplace Info Pack’.  
32 Department for Education and others, ‘£1 million for innovative student mental health projects’ UK 
Government (5 March 2020). 
33 ‘Postscript’ (n 1) 4. 
been radically dispersed, with detection, prevention, and mitigation (recovery being 
ancillary) of illness now increasingly undertaken by the corporation and its agents, 
including crucially the employee herself qua employee or human capital. She will 
contact her mental health first aider colleague or her employer (though any difference 
between the two seems doubtful). She will purchase products—self-help books,  
meditation apps, tickets to motivational talks—with a view to her greater productivity 
and, hence, ‘employability’. In fact, the monetary value she attributes (through her 
valuable spare time as much as through her pay-power) to her own productivity and 
employability may reduce the corporate system’s nascent role in facilitating 
compliance; her self-improvement becomes her guiding, internalised ethos as a 
consumer-employee and she will discipline herself, knowing this self-improvement 
will be coded and rewarded.  
 
Thus, technologies of power in the modern, mental health context cannot be identified 
within a healthcare system, a corporate system or an education system, nor even 
within what might be dubbed a ‘consumer system’; there is no single system of 
operation of which we can speak. This conceptual challenge itself demonstrates the 
ultimate annihilation of the institutions Deleuze anticipates in societies of control.  
 
Vignette D 
In May 2021, the UK government proposed halving state funding for university 
courses they do not regard as ‘strategic priorities’, such as music, drama, visual arts, 
and archaeology. It is estimated that such courses would run at a deficit of £2,700 per 
enrolled student, and many courses may therefore have to close if the plans go ahead. 
The government says the decision is ‘designed to target taxpayers’ money towards the 
subjects which support the skills this country needs to build back better’.34 They also 
say universities should “focus [...] upon subjects which deliver strong graduate 
employment outcomes in areas of economic and societal importance”.35 
 
Deleuze foretold the ‘effect on the school of perpetual training, and the corresponding 
abandonment of all university research’.36 Alarming an idea as this may be, the above 
vignette should at least discourage us from dismissing it altogether. The government’s 
proposal betrays a deeply production-oriented approach to higher education that sees 
knowledge and learning as purely instrumental to the development of concrete ‘skills’ 
to be directed at the most economically valuable production of goods and services 
and, correspondingly, the strongest employment outcomes. 
 
The UK education system no longer possesses its own watchwords (save, perhaps, 
‘instilling British Values’). Instead, all activity is directed at the future employment 
prospects of the student. The privatisation of schools (through academisation in 
England) has allowed for corporate sponsorship that makes this close instrumentalism 
perfectly plain: the corporation’s senior managers become senior managers of 
underperforming schools and they are expected to foster students’ ‘aspirations’. Here, 
the corporate and educational systems are blended together, the former funding the 
latter, the latter supplying labour to the former. The physical spaces in which learning 
 
34 Lanre Bakare and Richard Adams, ‘Plans for 50% funding cuts to arts subjects at universities 
“catastrophic’ The Guardian (6 May 2021). 
35 Richard Adams, ‘English universities must prove “commitment” to free speech for bailouts’ The 
Guardian (16 July 2020). 
36 ‘Postscript’ (n 1) 7. 
occurs can at times barely be distinct from the corporate, whether a company name is 
printed across the school entrance (‘Bridge Academy in partnership with UBS’) or 




There is a great deal of truth to Deleuze’s thesis that societies of control are replacing 
disciplinary societies. We have noted the destruction of swathes of confined and 
discrete spaces; the intermixing of institutions; the pervasive power of technology to 
tweak and modulate behaviour through coding; and the pointless but universal ethos 
of motivation. As Deleuze ably demonstrates, analyses of discipline, confinement, 
hierarchy, and masses can only take us so far in understanding these forces. More 
necessary in our quest to uncover the telos we are being made to serve is a socio-
technological study of control and its methods. 
 
However, this essay has also sought to demonstrate the limits of Deleuze’s proposed 
methodology. For a ‘categorical’ socio-technological study of control becomes more 
elusive the more deeply a society succumbs to control. Schools, prisons, barracks, 
hospitals, factories, offices, and homes are increasingly blended (and so less discrete) 
environments. The office educates, entertains, protects, and diagnoses its employees. 
The school is a business, its pupils are prospective employees. University is a career 
stage. Beds, dining tables, and lounges are workstations. For those on ‘home 
detention’ during coronavirus in the United States or under TPIMs (Terrorism 
Prevention and Investigation Measures) in the United Kingdom, these same spaces 
are prison cells. The gradual annihilation of the disciplines as physical and conceptual 
spaces—which Deleuze foresaw—also renders obsolete our existing methods of 
understanding power. We are in need of new tools to respond to these developments; 
the study of categories must be replaced with the study of networks and systems. We 
must explore with curiosity and thoroughness the complex web of relations operating 
through spaces and lives.  
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